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The NSDAP Vote in the Weimar Republic: 
An Assessment of the State-of-the-Art in View of 
Modern Electoral Research (1) 
Manfred Kuechler* 
Abstract: Over the last decade, several authors have 
questioned the conventional wisdom about the rise of 
Nazism in the Weimar Republic: that Hitler's main sup-
port came from the lower middle-classes. They suggest a 
much broader support base for the Nazis. Most pointed-
ly, they describe the NSDAP as a first Volkspartei - in 
part using a much improved data base and employing 
complex statistical techniques. This paper examines the 
true extent of substantive differences, assesses the me-
thodological soundness of various studies, and offers a 
synthesis of insights based on solid empirical evidence. 
Rhetoric aside, the more recent studies provide refine-
ment and corroboration rather than grounds for a 
fundamental revision. As a guide for further research, a 
shift from global statistical analysis to local and regio-
nal studies using a multitude of data sources is recom-
mended. 
Introduction 
Who voted for Hitler is more than a matter of purely historical interest 
and of scholarly debate - in Germany as well as abroad. Viewed from 
abroad, there is widespread agreement that (West) Germany established 
itself as a stable democracy, as a society solidly rooted in democratic norms 
and values in the post-war period. After some early doubts about the Ger-
mans ' t rue commitment to the new order (Almond and Verba 1963), subse-
quent studies found ample empirical evidence for a genuine transforma-
tion (e.g. Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt 1981). Some even see West Ger-
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many as a 'model stable democracy' (Conradt 1980:265). Yet, some doubts 
kept lingering and surfaced at various occasions (see Kuechler 1992c). The 
process of German unification, the prospect of a unified and even more 
powerful Germany, then, once again triggered the emergence of latent 
fears and concerns. They showed in statements by the elites rather than in 
public opinion polls - but polls are rather inept in gauging ambivalence 
and latent resentment. For example, one day after the ratification of the 
treaty on economic and monetary union and the declaration to guarantee 
Poland's existing borders by the two German parliaments on June 21,1990 
the New York Times expressed these fears quite bluntly: »Whom should 
we distrust more - the Russians or the Germans?« (Safire 1990). This 
commentary was part of a series of editorials and news stories reminding 
the world about Germany's dark past. The more sweeping changes in Ea-
stern Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union then quickly diverted atten-
tion away from Germany - till the outburst of violent attacks on foreigners 
in the fall of 1991 and the display of new assertiveness of the German 
government, e.g. by pushing for early recognition of Croatia or by trying to 
reestablish German as a lingua franca in diplomatic affairs. In spite of all 
documented good democratic behavior, the Germans still seem to be on 
probation - at least as viewed by small, but influential minorities abroad. 
Within (West) Germany, the so called »Historikerstreit« of the mid-
1980s (for a summary see Herz 1987) triggered an intense public debate 
bringing the Nazi past to the forefront again. And the process of unifica-
tion led to reflections on the nature of German nationalism and to much 
reluctance on part of the intellectual Left to embrace the idea of a unified 
Germany. Mass support for unification was uniformly high cutting across 
partisan lines, but it was grounded in expectations of economic gains ra-
ther than in national chauvinism (Kuechler 1992b). However, continuing 
transition problems and disappointment with the actual course of de facto 
unification may create a situation where the depth and stability of demo-
cratic convictions in the now larger German public is put to a true test. 
For the most part, scholarly disputes in the social sciences have little or 
no bearing on politics or on everyday life. Coming to grips with the Nazi 
past, fully understanding the Weimar experience, though, is quintessential 
for building and maintaining a stable social and political order in Ger-
many and in all of Europe. Today, an assessment of old and new expla-
nations for the rise of Hitler is as important as ever. And the logic of 
scholarly inquiry dictates to consider both substance and method. 
In contrast to Spain and Italy, fascism in Germany rose to power at the 
polls. The German National Socialists (Nazis) succeeded in elections 
which - up to 1932 - deserve to be called 'democratic'. Therefore, indivi-
dual voting behavior constitutes an essential component in a compre-
hensive analysis of the transformation from democratic rule to a totalita-
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rian regime. Studying voting behavior, focusing on the individual voter 
and on segments of voters with similar characteristics, however, is a com-
plement rather than an alternative to macro level analysis. Macro level 
theories typically cannot be put to a stringent empirical test, but often 
more specific assertions about micro level behavior are implied. These 
implications, then, need to be compatible with available data on individual 
level behavior. This way, empirically grounded theories of voting beha-
vior, provide for at least partial tests of more comprehensive attempts to 
explain the rise of fascism in Germany. 
Nevertheless, until recently there were few stringent empirical analyses 
of voting behavior in the Weimar Republic. Major contributions to the 
explanation of Nazism (e.g. Bendix, 1952; Burnham, 1972; Kornhauser, 
1959; Lipset, 1960) use selected voting data in an impressionistic manner 
or superficially reassess the few more comprehensive empirical analyses 
(e.g. Loomis and Beegle, 1946; Pratt, 1948). These, in turn, lack methodo-
logical rigor and appear to be flawed in many ways. A sole exception is 
Heberle's (1945) contemporaneous work which was published with much 
delay. Heberle's study is limited by its exclusive focus on the Schleswig-
Holstein region, though. Also, applying today's standards, the data analysis 
lacks sophistication though it is adequate given its time. Finally, in the 
1980s, a number of methodologically more sophisticated studies arrived at 
conclusions suggesting major revisions of previously established explana-
tions (e.g. Brown, 1982; Childers, 1983; Falter et al., 1983; Falter, 1984 and 
1991; Falter and Hanisch, 1986; Hamilton, 1982). However, in part these 
revisions are at odds with each other. 
In the following, I will offer a comparative assessment of the earlier and 
the more recent studies from the vantage point of present day electoral 
sociology. I will offer my view of what should be considered as the body of 
well established knowledge, as evidence solidly grounded in empirical da-
ta. To do this, much attention must be paid to methodological problems. 
However, I will not address the methodological and statistical issues in 
technical detail, but rather discuss them in a format accessible to the non-
specialist. In general, I feel that sound statistical procedure cannot hurt, 
but that adherence to technical rules does not necessarily lead to a more 
meaningful sociological analysis. Compared with modern election re-
search, there is a greater need in historical election research to utilize a 
multitude of data and information coming from different sources in in-
novative ways. There are no fully codified procedures for this kind of 
empirical analysis - combining qualitative and quantitative elements - not 
now and not in the future. Methodological problems, then, are not confi-
ned to aspects of complex statistical analysis. 
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The Conflicting Results 
The traditional view. To start things off a brief review of official election 
returns may be helpful (see table 1). These results suggest a rather straight-
forward interpretation on the global level. While the share for the left 
parties and the Catholic block remains basically unchanged, the share for 
the established bourgeois parties continuously decreases. At first, new 
splinter parties benefit from this demise. However, apart from the 
NSDAP, they are not able to consolidate their gains. This suggest an ad-
ditional (quite plausible, but not logically deductible) interpretation: Left 
parties and the Catholic block parties did keep their clientele constant, not 
just the size of their vote share. To put it differently: Voter swings were 
restricted to flows between the bourgeois parties, the splinter parties, the 
non-voters, and the NSDAP. Table 1 shows the net result of these flows 
only; more complex flows could have resulted in the same table. However, 
if the minimal flow thesis is correct, then the success of the NSDAP is a 
direct consequence of the bourgeois parties' loss and - to a lesser extent -
of increased turnout (successful mobilization). 
Table 1: Official returns in Weimar Elections 1924-1932 in per cent of 
eligible voters* 
Year 
Party groups 
Left parties 
1924b 1928 1930 1932a 1932b 
(SPD, USPD, KPD) 27.4 30.2 30.7 30.1 29.8 
Catholic Block 
(Zentrum, BVP) 13.5 11.3 12.1 13.4 12.3 
Bourgeois parties 
(DDP/DSP, DVP, DNVP) 28.7 20.8 12.7 7.0 9.3 
NSDAP 2.3 2.0 14.9 31.2 26.5 
Other parties 5.8 10.4 11.1 1.7 2.1 
Non-voters 21.2 24.4 18.0 15.9 19.4 
* Table entries are based on official election returns as reported by Falter 
et al. (1986, p.41) in their table 1.3.1.1. The difference to 100 reflects the 
share of voters marking their ballot invalidly (1.0 per cent in 1924 and 
1928; .6 per cent for the three following elections). Similar tables in the 
literature show some discrepancies (see e.g. Hanisch 1983, p.281/282; Fal-
ter and Hanisch 1986). Hamilton (1982, p.476) combines the BVP (Bava-
rian equivalent of Zentrum) with the other parties and thus misrepresents 
the Catholic block. 
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If we further assume that a. the party system reflects social cleavages in 
the electorate, that b. parties primarily represent the group-specific interest 
of specific social strata (e.g. industrial workers, Catholics), and that c. so-
cial class was a dominant factor determining individual voting behavior, 
we can then conclude that the voters of the NSDAP were mainly made up 
of the Protestant lower middle class. Such an interpretation was first put 
forward in contemporaneous analyses - most notably by Heberle (1945 (2), 
p.121): »The main mass support came, as we have clearly shown, from the 
middle layers of society, from those Kleinbauern and Kleinbürger who in 
the past had adhered to political ideas very different from those charac-
teristic of the Nazi creed. We have seen how the National Socialists, by 
appealing to certain deep-seated resentments and sentiments, by skillfully 
utilizing economic interests and, we may add, by concealing their own 
ultimate aims, gradually won the support of these classes.« Later on, Lipset 
(1960) became one of the most fervent advocates of this explanation. For a 
long time, the »Protestant lower middle class« thesis stood unchallenged 
and was considered as solidly grounded knowledge. 
Yet, there also was some disagreement. Several authors (e.g. Kornhau-
ser, 1959) questioned the relevance of social class membership for indivi-
dual behavior in general, and its impact on voting behavior in particular. 
They focus on what they perceive as 'mass society', a society in which the 
individual increasingly lacks firmly established ties. In the absence of firm 
personal and institutional ties, individuals become likely to fall prey to 
mobilization efforts of mass movements. This mass society perspective was 
most prominently used by Bendix (1952) to explain the rise of Nazism, but 
he later recanted. Bendix shared the view that the clientele of Left and 
Catholic parties remained stable, but he suggested a modification of the 
second link in this explanation. In his view, the resistance of unionized 
workers and of Catholics to National Socialism rests on the conservation 
of personal and institutional ties. Not a difference of class interests, but a 
much weaker social fabric made protestant lower middle class voters more 
susceptible to the NSDAP. 
Burnham's (1972) theory of 'political confessionalism' takes a middle 
ground. He offers an explanation why the ties between the protestant 
middle classes and their parties were weaker than those of other segments. 
Notwithstanding important differences, all explanations contend that both 
Catholicism and organized labor were resistent to National Socialism at 
least up to the end of the Weimar Republic. Thus, these segments of the 
German population were not part of providing democratic legitimization 
to the Nazis whose rise to power must then be accredited to the vulnera-
bility of the protestant middle classes. 
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Recent American studies. In the 1980s, several scholars both in the Uni-
ted States and in Germany set out to further scrutinize this seemingly well 
proven thesis. Overall, they do not refute this explanation altogether. Ho-
wever, they suggest a number of significant modifications and refine-
ments. Before assessing the validity of these revisionist claims, I will brief-
ly summarize these studies. 
Among the American studies, the monographs by Childers (1983, the 
revised version of a 1976 Ph.D. thesis) and by Hamilton (1982) have re-
ceived wide spread attention. Also, a number of other Ph.D. theses from 
the 1970s (e.g. Meckstroth, 1972; Waldman, 1973; Wernette, 1974) helped 
to set the research agenda of later work in Germany (e.g. Falter 1980 and 
Hänisch 1983). However, they went largely unnoticed beyond the small 
group of scholars working on the subject. 
Turning to Childers and Hamilton, we find that, in essence, Childers 
reconfirms Heberle's analysis: 
»The nucleus of the NSDAP's following was formed by the small far-
mers, shopkeepers, and independent artisans of the old middle class, 
who constituted the most stable and consistent components of the Na-
tional Socialist constituency between 1924 and 1932.« (Childers, 1983, 
p.264) 
However, Childers introduces a more differentiated view of the middle 
class. His analysis finds only limited and fluctuating support of the 
NSDAP by white collar workers and by retired middle class people. In 
contrast, he claims considerable support by the upper middle class: 
»Although National Socialist sympathies among lower-middle-class whi-
te-collar employees were less developed than expected, the NSDAP 
found a surprisingly large following in more established social circles.« 
(p.264) 
Finally, Childers argues for a differentiated look on the working class. 
While the NSDAP was unable to make significant gains among the uni-
onized industrial workers, the Nazis found considerable support among 
workers in crafts and small business. Viewed over time, Childers sees the 
NSDAP as developing to a »Volkspartei« (p.265), to a »catch-all party of 
protest« (p.268). By 1932, the NSDAP electorate is bonded by deep rooted 
contempt for the existing political and economic order. 
Hamilton's multi-layered considerations in his attempt to explain the 
»Weimar Catastrophe« are difficult to summarize briefly. Though he de-
votes much space to an empirical analysis of voting data, his explanations 
do not rely exclusively on these data. With good reason, Hamilton is skep-
tical about the potential of a purely quantitative statistical analysis. Yet, his 
exposition makes it difficult at times to discern the logical status of his 
assertions. In contrast to Childers, Hamilton (1982, p.424-428) is much 
more outspoken in his refutation of the dominant lower middle class' 
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theory and explanations following the Marxist or the mass society tradi-
tion do not fare any better. Hamilton's analysis of voting returns in selec-
ted large cities (see also his later analysis of Braunschweig in Hamilton 
1984) discovers above average Nazi vote shares in precincts with a high 
proportion of upper middle class. To put these pieces of empirical evidence 
into a comprehensive conceptual framework Hamilton outlines an »alter-
native theory« (p.437) which at times he also refers to as a 'group-bases 
position'. Though not always clearly labeled this way, his theory uses con-
cepts first developed by the Michigan School of voting research such as 
party identification, normal vote, and realignment (see e.g. Kuechler 
1992a). As a consequence of system failure, traditional ties between parties 
and electorate erode, voters are becoming increasingly open to new op-
tions. And in Hamilton's view, only the NSDAP succeeded in presenting 
itself as a viable new option. 
»The rise of the NSDAP later in the decade [the 1920s, M.K.] was, as 
indicated, an instance of the third kind of elections [the creation of a 
new political option, M.K.]. The new party's cadres provided a new set of 
influences, a new set of social pressures that, taken in connection with 
the other factors aiding them, led to the generation of a mass following.« 
(Hamilton, 1982, p.443) 
Based on this conclusion, Hamilton argues to shift the focus of analysis 
to the mobilization process, to the strategies employed and to the organi-
zational setting: 
»The key focus in the present explanation of National Socialism invol-
ves the role of the party's cadres, of its militants, or, to use a social 
science expression, of its 'opinion leaders'.« (p.441) 
By implication then, the question of the composition of the NSDAP 
electorate, is of secondary importance - or Hamilton may view the 
NSDAP as a catch-all party without a clear socio-demographic profile in 
the first place. 
To conclude the review of more recent American work, Brown (1982) 
must be noted. In contrast to Childers and Hamilton, Brown's analysis 
employs rather complex state-of-the-art statistical techniques. Unfortuna-
tely, it is based on the old ICPSR data set which is plagued by many flaws 
(see e.g. Falter and Gruner 1981). Also, the format of a short journal 
article does not allow to explain his methodology in detail and surely lea-
ves most readers somewhat puzzled. Similar to Childers, Brown does not 
refute the lower middle class' thesis altogether. Rather he suggests a num-
ber of modifications. Brown sees support for the NSDAP among some part 
of the working class; slightly different from Childers he identifies this 
segment as workers in trades and transportation. Most significantly, 
Brown emphasizes the Catholic contribution to the success of the Nazis -
among workers in trades and transportation and among the urban petite 
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bourgeoisie. All in all, Brown's also suggest to define the NSDAP electo-
rate more broadly than the lower middle class' thesis implies. 
Recent German work. On the German side, the study by Hänisch (1983) 
and the work by Jürgen Falter and his collaborators are most important. In 
addition, Manstein (1988) provides an overview on a broad range of work 
related to the rise of National Socialism including historical voting re-
search. Hänisch's study is a M.A. thesis completed at the University of 
Duisburg in 1981/82. He later joined the Falter group, which started out 
with a major project to generate a reliable data set combining official 
election returns with census data on low aggregation levels (»Kreise« and 
»Gemeinden«). The tedious and time consuming construction of this data 
base constitutes a major advance in the field, since the data will be fully 
available to all interested scholars. After completion of the first phase, it 
provided the base for numerous analyses and publications of the Falter 
group, only some of which are explicitly referenced in this article (see 
below). Recently, a comprehensive book publication has become available 
(Falter 1991). 
Hänisch emphasizes the significance of religious affiliation which star-
ting in 1930 constitutes the most important factor impacting on voting 
behavior - independently from social class (p.225). In addition, Hänisch 
stresses the urban-rural difference. He sees an urban-rural realignment 
process (p.226), a shift from the urban Protestants to the rural Protestants 
as target of successful Nazi mobilization (p. 116). In part, Hänisch recon-
firms earlier findings by Heberle and by Lipset, but his final conclusion is 
markedly different, refuting the predominance of the middle classes in the 
Nazi support base: 
»Die soziale Basis der NSDAP speiste sich aus allen Schichten. ... Ihr 
Elektorat besaß folglich klassenübergreifenden Charakter, wobei jedoch 
tendenziell ein Mittelschichteneinfluß erkennbar war. ... Die These j e -
doch, daß das Elektorat der NSDAP überwiegend durch die Mittel-
schichten geprägt war, mußte nach den vorliegenden Ergebnissen ver-
worfen werden.« (Hänisch, 1983, p.228) 
Also, Hänisch finds no support for a relationship between increased 
turnout and Nazi vote share in the 1930 election. Matter of fact, he claims 
definitive proof of the absence of such a relationship (p.229). 
As noted above, the publications of Jürgen Falter and his group are too 
numerous to be reviewed in detail (3), but the main thrust of their argu-
ment can be easily described. Similar to Childers (1983) and Hänisch 
(1983), Falter and his collaborators (e.g. Falter and Hänisch, 1986, p.215) 
find significant empirical evidence conflicting with the lower middle 
class' thesis. Instead, they put forward the notion of the NSDAP as Volk-
spartei' as far as its voter clientele is concerned. In particular, they find 
NSDAP support coming from parts of the working class. Most likely, these 
workers had previously voted for bourgeois parties or had abstained. 
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To summarize: First, all of the more recent analyses either downright 
refute or significantly modify the established lower middle class' thesis. 
All authors emphasize the fact that the NSDAP electorate cuts across all 
strata. Yet, the resistance of the Catholic rural population on the one hand 
and of the unionized industrial workers on the other is not challenged. 
Secondly, there is general agreement (and this includes the earlier studies) 
that a growing dissatisfaction with the output of the political system was 
essential in the Nazi's rise to power - as a prerequisite or at least as rein-
forcement. This can be seen in Childers' characterization of the NSDAP as 
a 'catch-all party of protest' or in Hamilton's classification of the 1930 
elections as 'realigning'. There is less consensus on the exact form of per-
ceived output deficiencies - be it primarily economic or other. In parti-
cular, the notion that rising unemployment was a principal and direct 
factor in the rise of the NSDAP is hotly contested. Such a notion was 
entertained by e.g. Frey and Week (1981) based on econometric models 
with highly aggregated data. This issue, then, was among the first to be 
addressed by the Falter group (Falter 1984; Falter at al. 1983) after the 
»Kreise« data base had been established. 
On the national level, unemployment and Nazi vote share do rise jointly 
over time. Contingent upon choice of indicators, this relationship is more 
or less obvious - without employing any sophisticated statistical tools. On a 
lower aggregation level, however, Falter finds a negative relationship bet-
ween level of unemployment and Nazi vote share. As a consequence, it is 
not plausible to assume that individual unemployed voters were particu-
larly drawn to the NSDAP. Only further differentiation, like using group 
specific unemployment rates for white collar and blue collar workers, does 
produce a (very modest) positive relationship between white collar unem-
ployment and Nazi vote (see also Speier 1986). Finally, the impact of un-
employment is further mediated by the social context (level of urbanity, 
dominant religious affiliation). In sum, there is no compelling evidence to 
suggest that unemployment was a uniformly strong and direct, if not 
downright decisive factor in the rise of the NSDAP. 
Scope and Limits of Aggregate Analysis 
The lower middle class' theory has been essential in shaping the scholarly 
as well as the lay view of the Weimar Republic and of its demise. The 
impact of this thesis goes way beyond the realm of historical voting re-
search. Matter of fact, it was established as conventional wisdom not just 
by empirical voting studies, but maybe more so by political theorizing. A 
case in point is Lipset's (1960) much cited treatise which rests on theore-
tical arguments and an assessment of available voting studies rather than 
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on an original empirical analysis. The more recent voting studies are of 
importance, then, not just for the special field of historical voting research, 
but for a much more general assessment of the Nazi era. It is necessary to 
determine whether the new voting studies do provide a clearly superior 
empirical base on which theories of larger range should be built. As a 
consequence, some attention must be paid to the methodological issues 
involved. 
In a first step I will outline a series of methodological criteria to assess 
the reliability and validity of the various voting studies. With these in 
mind, I will discuss the merit of more recently introduced revisions to the 
traditional view. Finally, I will describe what I see as safely established 
knowledge on the subject. 
The aggregation problem. Obviously, the most difficult problem histo-
rical voting research faces is the lack of individual level data. Starting with 
1940s, the tools of survey research have been developed to collect data on 
individual voting behavior along with background characteristics (like so-
cial class or religious affiliation) as well as attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. 
The survey method makes it possible to analyze the relationship between 
individual traits and vote choice; this has been the major feat of modern 
voting research (see Kuechler 1992a). In contrast, historical voting re-
search as well as present day voting research in countries without an 
established tradition of survey research are lacking these seemingly indi-
spensable tools. At best, official voting returns can be matched with census 
data on a rather low aggregation level and the units on this aggregation 
level can then be treated as cases in a statistical analysis. Today, it is com-
mon knowledge among sociologists, and not just among methodologists, 
that a relationship between two variables on the aggregate level may or 
may not reflect a relationship on the level of the individual. An inference 
about the individual level may be justified, but there is always the risk of 
an ecological fallacy. Unfortunately, in most cases it is impossible to safely 
determine whether or not a relationship found on the aggregate level holds 
on the individual level as well. To use an illustration from present day 
Germany: Using urban precincts as aggregation units, we typically find a 
positive relationship between the vote share for the Greens and the per-
centage of guest workers. Obviously, guest workers do not vote for the 
Greens more often than other people. Matter of fact, they do not vote for 
the Greens at all - because they are not eligible to vote. Here, we are sure 
that an inference about the individual level would be erroneous, using 
additional knowledge about institutional arrangements. However, when 
we consider variables like unemployment rate or percentage of workers for 
specific geo-political units, an inference with respect to the behavior of 
individual may be correct. This is nothing new, and all authors discussed 
here are fully aware of the problem. In their writings, there are many 
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warnings to this effect. At the same time, supposedly just to improve the 
prose (e.g. Hänisch, 1983, p.64), the wording often strongly suggests an 
individual level interpretation. However, neither these general warnings 
nor explicit disclaimers - that individual level behavior is not at issue -
sufficiently deal with the problem at hand. With some exceptions, the 
spatial units typically used in historical voting research (4) are not of in-
terest in themselves. For example, most »Kreise« are defined by rather 
arbitrarily drawn boundaries which are often redrawn over time to accom-
modate administrative goals. (5) To be sure, there are some »Kreise« in 
Germany representing a specific local culture. As a rule, however, they 
cannot be considered as meaningful social entities providing the people 
living there with a specific identity. Taking issue with Hänisch (1983, p.63), 
I contend that voting research is concerned with individual political be-
havior and that its results are perceived this way - irrespective of the 
author's rhetoric. The problem of an ecological fallacy cannot be adequa-
tely resolved by shifting the focus away from the individual. Rather, aggre-
gate level analysis must be designed to minimize the danger of an ecolo-
gical fallacy. 
Criteria. It is possible to develop a set of criteria by which the metho-
dological soundness of any aggregate level analysis can be judged. Howe-
ver, these criteria are just necessary, yet not sufficient conditions for the 
validity of the research. As the authors of an introductory text on the 
subject (Langbein and Lichtman, 1978, p.61) conclude: »Theory, not tech-
nique, is the key to ecological inferences It can be rather misleading to 
judge a study solely on the plausibility of its substantive results, but com-
plex (and, unfortunately, as a consequence often rather incomprehensible) 
statistical machinery alone does not necessarily render meaningful expla-
nations either. The following criteria are especially geared towards voting 
research. They do not contain any new insights. Rather, they represent 
somewhat of a consensus among methodologists - possible disagreement 
over details notwithstanding. (6) 
(1) The level of aggregation should be as low as possible. For example, 
the level of »Gemeinden« (communities) is more suitable than the 
level of »Kreise« (counties), which is better than the level of »Wahl-
kreise» (7) of which there were just 35 in the case of Weimar. Ho-
wever, certain data may not be available at a preferred lower level of 
aggregation (e.g. no unemployment figures on the Gemeinde level). 
Also, the gain in reduced aggregation must be balanced against the 
effort needed to construct such a data set. 
(2) Party success should be measured by vote share based on all eligible 
voters. Absolute number of votes require additional controls for the 
size of the aggregation unit; vote shares based on votes cast or valid 
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votes require a similar control. In addition, when regressing the vote 
variable on indicators like percentage of workers estimates will be 
biased - unless turnout is uniform across these indicators. For tech-
nical details see Grofman (1987, p.42-44). 
(3) Ideally, all indicators should be defined relative to a common base, 
the number of eligible voters in the aggregation unit. If this is not 
possible given the data available, the effect of different operationa-
lizations should be checked by running parallel analyses. (8) 
(4) Data should be analyzed using multiple regression (»ecological 
regression«) and unstandardized regression coefficients (b) rather 
than bivariate correlation coefficients (r). Bivariate analyses do not 
guard against the impact of third factors; standardized coefficients 
further complicate the ecological inference. (9) 
(5) In specifying regression models both context and interaction effects 
should be considered; misspecified models may render highly biased 
estimates. The possibility of interaction effects is often recognized in 
the substantive discussion, e.g. by assuming a different effect of re-
ligious affiliation in rural and in urban areas or by positing varying 
effects of unemployment rates in different economic sectors. (10) 
The statistical model, then, should reflect the complexity of the sub-
stantive argument. 
(6) Vote shares for all major parties or party blocks plus the share of 
non-voters should be included in the analysis. Emphasis should be 
placed on overall patterns rather than single coefficients. 
(7) An estimation technique suitable for the particular kind of data (va-
riables of restricted range, high likelihood of correlated errors, etc.) 
should be used. (11) Conventional OLS regression often serves as a 
good approximation; major results should be double checked using 
more refined forms of estimation (see e.g. Hanushek and Jackson 
1977 as a good reference for social scientists). If shares for all parties 
are considered - as recommended - SURE (= seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation) should be used, as described in Zellner, 1962, 
or in Grofman and Michalski, 1988, as applied to election research. 
(8) Obviously, using complex statistical techniques adequate technical 
documentation is necessary. However, typically the results can also 
be presented in a form accessible to a reader with just modest stati-
stical background. Choice of adequate statistical tools does not pre-
clude a form of presentation suitable for a methodologically less so-
phisticated readership. (12) 
In addition, it is taken for granted that units are not selected arbitrarily. In 
general, the area of the Weimar Republic - or whatever special population 
is under study, e.g. Hamilton's (1982) analysis of large cities - must be fully 
covered to eliminate an additional source of bias. (13) Also, great care 
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must be exercised in the preparation of the data set. Apart from the ob-
vious data cleaning, some merging of primary units may be necessary to 
achieve constant boundaries over time. With the work of the Falter group, 
a much better data set has become available for future research. (14) All 
things considered, aggregate analysis can legitimately be used to study in-
dividual voting behavior provided that proper caution is exercised. The 
recommendations above are to minimize the likelihood of ecological fal-
lacies. These and other suggestions, e.g. the study of homogeneous units 
(Duncan and Davis, 1953), are a constructive response to Robinson's 
(1950) well justified, but overly gloomy warning. 
Limits. However, there are limits to this kind of analysis. At times, 
researchers get carried away with numbers, with the fascination of see-
mingly precise quantitative measurement. I am particularly skeptical ab-
out a specific variant of ecological regression which is sometimes referred 
to as »(voter) swing analysis«. Here, an attempt is made to estimate the 
probability to vote for party A at a given election provided that party B was 
preferred at the preceding election - for all possible combinations of two 
parties, also including abstention as vote for a dummy party. For each 
party, such a model would state the percentages of previous voters who 
stayed with this party, who switched to any one of the competing parties, 
and who chose to abstain. Certainly, a fascinating idea. Models of this kind 
have been pursued with respect to both the Weimar elections (e.g. by Fal-
ter, 1987, p.490 and 502; and by Falter and Hänisch, 1986, p.211) and 
present day elections in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to arrive at reliable estimates for 
models of this sort. When survey data are available, initial 'transition rates' 
are derived from the respondents' recall of past and recent vote choice. 
Using smoothing algorithms, these estimates are then made compatible 
with the official election returns (marginal distributions). Sampling fluc-
tuation, recall errors, and changes in the electorate produce margins of 
errors which make it unwise to take such estimated transition rates at face 
value (see e.g. Hoschka and Schunk, 1975; or Kuechler, 1983). In the ab-
sence of survey data, the situation is even less favorable. Here, un-
standardized coefficients obtained when regressing recent party vote sha-
res on preceding vote shares are interpreted as transition rates. Obviously, 
transition rates need to be in the range between 0 and 100 per cent. Ty-
pically, using conventional estimation techniques, (some) regression coef-
ficients fall outside this range. For the purpose of swing analysis, this can 
be avoided by technical manipulations (e.g. by ridge regression) the exact 
form of which can not be justified by plausible substantive assumptions 
(see Kuechler 1983). In short: Swing analyses are exciting and easy to 
grasp, unfortunately they are built on rather shaky methodological 
grounds. The Falter group is not oblivious to the problems involved. A 
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careful reading (e.g. Falter and Hänisch, 1986, p.210) reveals quite a num-
ber of caveats, but they don't resist the temptation to present these analyses 
in a very suggestive manner. At best, swing analysis can provide qualitative 
trends and maybe ballpark figures, beyond this it amounts to reading tea 
leaves. 
More generally, aggregate analysis is limited by the type of information 
available and/or useful for this purpose. Obviously, data on attitudes and 
opinions are not available for historical voting research. But there are 
limitation on socio-demographic data as well. Age and sex composition is 
available from census data, but these indicators typically show very little 
variance across units (e.g. »Kreise«). Ecological regression, then, does not 
produce meaningful estimates of sex or age effects on voting. In the case of 
Weimar, this is a serious limitation. For substantive reasons detailed be-
low, significant such effects seem very plausible. 
Before addressing the substantive issues, I summarize my methodologi-
cal evaluation: Even some of the more recent work is seriously flawed with 
respect to the empirical analysis. This includes the generally well regarded 
monographs by Childers (1983) and by Hamilton (1982). Childers' study is 
plagued by fundamental statistical blunders (15) while Hamilton stops 
short of fully employing the instruments available. Only the work by 
Brown, Hänisch, and the Falter group represents an adequate level of me-
thodological sophistication. There are differences of opinion with respect 
to certain aspects, e.g. my skeptical view of swing analyses in contrast to 
Falter's inclination. Overall, the substantive assertions in these studies are 
firmly grounded in empirical evidence. 
Established Knowledge in Modern Voting Research 
Obviously, great advances have been made in statistical methodology and 
quite a few of them are relevant for improving historical voting research. 
However, as said before, statistical machinery is not sufficient by itself. 
What can be learnt from modern voting research to further our under-
standing of the rise of fascism during the Weimar Republic? Is modern 
voting research on a much more solid base than its historical counterpart? 
There is no easy answer to this question. On the one hand, there is a solidly 
established body of knowledge based upon a series of survey studies as well 
as the representative voting statistics collected by the German Bureau of 
the Census. Among the numerous surveys dealing with voting in the Fe-
deral Republic, scholarly research was most assisted by the series of elec-
tion studies initiated by Rudolf Wildenmann and Erwin K. Scheuch in the 
late 1950s. These studies provide systematic replication of key indicators 
and thus allow to monitor trends over time. And, they are generally avai-
lable for secondary analysis. (16) 
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Sex and age specific voting behavior is most accurately portrayed by an 
analysis of a very large sample of particularly marked ballots - as specified 
in the German election laws - conducted by the German Census Bureau. 
On the other hand, modern voting research has its share of controversy. 
There is no generally accepted theory of voting behavior, even when the 
focus is restricted in time and location to postwar West Germany. Space 
prohibits a detailed discussion of consensus and controversy in modern 
voting research (see e.g. Kuechler 1977, 1980, and 1986a for series of such 
assessments). Below I will present selective results which seem to be par-
ticular relevant for the study of voting behavior during the Weimar Re-
public. 
First, except for 1949 - and quite recently 1990, turnout in postwar West 
Germany has been uniformly high at about 85 to 90 per cent, clearly ex-
ceeding other Western democracies. Female turnout is slightly lower than 
male turnout, though the difference has decreased over time from about 
2.5 percentage points to just 1 percentage point. With respect to age groups, 
a curvilinear pattern has persisted over the years: increasing turnout from 
the youngest to the middle age groups with a marked downturn in the 
oldest group of people 70 years and above (see e.g. Statistisches Bundesamt, 
1984, p.27). Germans have become habitual voters, exercising the right to 
vote is largely considered as a democratic obligation, a norm of political 
behavior. Apart from generational replacement, the same persons vote in 
consecutive elections. (17) 
Second, up to the late 1960s party preference of women differed clearly 
from that of men. On average, vote share for the (conservative) Christian 
Democrats among women was about 8 percentage points higher than 
among men (see e.g. Statistisches Bundesamt, 1984, p.42). The sex dif-
ference disappeared in the 1970s and has not reemerged in any significant 
form. 
Third, vote choice is strongly influenced by social cleavages. Looking at 
the two major parties (CDU/CSU (18) and SPD), four indicators explain a 
large amount of variation in vote choice: social class, union membership, 
religious affiliation, and frequency of church attendance. Working class 
voters and union members tend to prefer the SPD, Catholics and frequent 
church attenders tend to opt for the CDU. (19) This structural pattern has 
not changed much over time. What has changed, however, is the size of the 
segment of voters which display socio-demographic characteristics most 
strongly determining party choice (such as the segment of active Catholics 
or of unionized workers). Or to put it the other way around: there is an 
increase of voters less tied to traditional cleavages and therefore more 
open to other influences. 
36 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 17 — 1992 — No. 1, 22-52
Fourth, at least for the two major parties, there are relatively strong and 
persistent ties between voters and parties. Unfortunately, the problem of 
how to reliably measure such party attachment is largely unresolved. The 
concept of party identification as developed in the Michigan school of 
voting research can easily be operationalized in the context of the Ame-
rican political system. Yet, variants of a literal translation do not work well 
elsewhere. In Germany, this measure is heavily confounded with mo-
mentary party preference and consequently is largely tautological. Never-
theless, such questions are widely used, and there are less critical voices in 
the debate. At any rate, it is rather difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate 
for the share of Volatile* voters. Conservatively, I guesstimate this share to 
be around 15 per cent of all voters. (20) 
Fifth, following the Michigan model, a considerable impact of issue 
evaluations on vote choice has been established for Germany as well. Per-
ceived competence (of parties) to deal with specific problems is closely 
related to vote choice. Whether this should be thought of as a unidirectio-
nal causal relationship is subject to debate, however. It seems safer to 
assume that there is a reciprocal relationship between party preference and 
issue competence evaluations: Adherents of a party are more inclined to 
perceive the party of their choice as most competent, but issue competence 
may also induce a preference shift. This leads to so called non-recursive 
models the estimation of which produces a whole new set of methodolo-
gical problems. However, questions of causality aside, it is instructive to 
determine which issues produce the closest relationship with vote choice. 
Here, perception of economic competence has consistently proven to be 
particularly important (e.g. Kuechler, 1985; Rattinger, 1985b). In contrast, 
results on the impact of the economic situation per se are decidedly more 
mixed (see Eulau and Lewis-Beck, 1985 for a cross-national review). In 
particular, there is little evidence that voters directly affected by unem-
ployment tend to drastic changes in their voting behavior (see e.g. Rattin-
ger 1985a). 
Sixth, the institutional setting of electoral rules and regulations consti-
tutes an important mediating factor. (21) The consolidation of the postwar 
party system in West Germany and corresponding clienteles was largely 
aided by a series of changes in the electoral law (up to the 1957 elections) 
which made it increasingly difficult for smaller parties to gain parlia-
mentary representation. 
So much for the body of knowledge modern voting research (on Ger-
many) has accumulated and which is generally agreed upon - notwithstan-
ding differences in emphasis. Also, since the late 1970s there is growing 
consensus that voting should be studied in a larger context. Voting is seen 
as the most prominent, but still just one manifestation of political beha-
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vior. And political preferences are shaped by drawing upon or being ex-
posed to various sources of information and opinion including personal 
networks (family, friends, peers) and mass media. Academic voting re-
search is shifting its focus from behavioral outcome (the actual voting 
decision) to the underlying dynamics of the individual voters' formation, 
maintenance, and change of (political) attitudes as they take their cues 
from others in their social network, from the media and from organiza-
tions and institutions they relate to. Taking this approach one step further, 
the boundaries of the 'political' realm are questioned, and the life space 
(»Lebenswelt«) of the voter becomes the object of investigation. (22) Ho-
wever, as of now, this is a research program yet to be fully implemented. 
All in all, the substantive results of modern voting research do not offer 
too much help in resolving the issues of research on Weimar. In general, it 
appears doubtful that theories dealing with social behavior in some detail 
can assume validity irrespective of time and location. Still, since the natio-
nal context is the same, it is not implausible to assume some continuities 
over time. To some extent, then, what we know about voting behavior in 
postwar Germany may be used to ascertain the validity of claims made 
about Weimar. 
Comparative Assessment 
Social classes and parties in the Weimar Republic. As described earlier, the 
recent studies agree in rejecting the pointed characterization of the 
NSDAP clientele as radicalized lower middle classes - as most prominent-
ly advanced by Lipset (1960). They seem to establish a much more varied 
profile of the Nazi voters, and in part (Falter, Hänisch) they are much 
sounder from a methodological point of view. Yet, is a major revision 
warranted? 
I am not to diminish the merits of these studies. It is important to collect 
and establish solid empirical evidence - beyond maybe correct, but largely 
intuitive insight. As far as substance is concerned, however, I feel that the 
differences are gradual only. Strong rhetoric seems to substitute for major 
new discoveries. And for the most part, the authors seem to be quite aware 
of the rather limited scope of truly warranted revisions. Falter, for exam-
ple, pushes the notion of the NSDAP as the first Volkspartei as a catchy 
label, but he is much more careful in discussing its true meaning. 
Apart from labeling, these more refined empirical analyses face one 
major problem: the limits of official statistics. In particular, the difference 
in definition between b lue ' and 'white' collar workers is not derived from 
some sociological concept, but follows the administrative logic of the Ger-
man social security system (»Reichsversicherungsordnung«). The category 
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of t)lue collar workers' not only comprises industrial workers, but a variety 
of other population segments which might as well as be classified as lower 
middle class. Many examples can be given, where the distinction between 
white and blue collar seems to be rather arbitrary. To name just one: Why 
is a saleslady considered as 'white collar' while a hairdresser is classified as 
'blue collar'? No surprise then, that segments within the »working class« -
as determined by census categories - can be found which were prone to 
vote for the NSDAP. Official statistics are a poor proxy to establish socio-
logical meaningful classes and strata, and, as a consequence, class analysis 
in the rise of Nazism can not be trusted to ecological regression alone. I do 
not concur with Allen's (1984) conclusion to abandon it altogether, but a 
more careful inspection of the underlying classification scheme is in order. 
I find it misleading to claim that major support for the NSDAP came from 
the »working class« - without proper reference to its operational defini-
tion. 
To further support the Volkspartei notion, the concept of cleavage vo-
ting, of a correspondence between the social cleavage structure of a po-
pulation and the party system as developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
is pushed to an extreme. In a modern industrial society there is no one-to-
one correspondence between social strata and political parties. No major 
party recruits its voters from just one single strata or class, and no strata 
uniformly votes for one particular party. A case in point is the Zentrum. 
According to the 1925 census, 32.4 per cent of the population were Ca-
tholic whereas the combined vote share for Zentrum and BVP averaged 
between 12 and 13 per cent in the 1924-1932 period. Even if we assume 
that no single Protestant voted for the Zentrum/BVP, this party would 
have represented less than 50 per cent of all Catholics. So the majority of 
Catholics voted for other parties. But do these parties become Volk-
sparteien in the process? 
I think there is some fundamental trouble with the notion of Volkspartei 
when taken out of its original context (Kirchheimer, 1969). Obviously, it is 
not sufficient to base this concept on just some diversity in the clientele of 
a party. Also, that a party presents itself as open to all segments of the 
population - like the two major parties today and with some exceptions 
the NSDAP then - should not be considered as a sufficient criterion. Mint-
zel (1984a, 1984b, 1991) has repeatedly argued to abandon the term Volk-
spartei as having neither analytic nor heuristic value, and I concur with his 
line of reasoning. 
What is left, is the now solidly established fact that the NSDAP clientele 
was more diversified than those of the Catholic and of the Left block 
parties. In part, this a simple consequence of the heterogeneity of the lower 
middle classes. In essence, then, there is no need for a major revision of 
the traditional thesis that the lower middle classes provided the major 
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support base for the Nazis. The new studies add important detail. Howe-
ver, by taking to catchy, but rather vague labels like »Volkspartei« these 
refinements are easily lost. Here, the strong rhetoric is counterproductive. 
It tends to obscure rather than to emphasize the importance of this work. 
Sound empirical confirmation and additional refinements, this is the ma-
jor achievement of the Falter group and it is not a small feat. 
For example, it is now convincingly demonstrated that both Zentrum 
and Left block parties not only kept their vote share constant, but that they 
kept their clientele intact. This appeared quite plausible given the global 
results (see again table 1), but now we can be sure about it. A major piece 
common to otherwise conflicting explanations of the rise of Nazism 
(Lipset, Kornhauser, Burnham - as detailed above) has been reconfirmed. 
Yet, on the issue of party attachments, additional questions are of inter-
est. In particular, we may find significant differences between men and 
women in their attachment to particular parties. Extrapolating to the past, 
the ties between Catholics and the Zentrum may be much stronger among 
female voters, and the ties between the industrial working class and the 
Left parties may be more pronounced among male voters. As discussed 
above, such sex differences can not be investigated by aggregate data ana-
lysis. However, some empirical evidence is furnished by official returns, 
samples of which were marked indicating sex and age group of the voter 
(see Falter et al., 1986, p.81-84). In contrast to the election statistics in the 
Federal Republic later on, these special counts (»Sonderauszahlungen«) 
are not fully representative of the electorate, though. At any rate, it cannot 
be taken for granted that spouses voted alike. To a possibly significant 
extent, then, individual households may have produced votes for different 
parties. Class indicators, however, are either explicitly (when using the 
head of household as reference) or implicitly (given that double incomes 
were the exception rather than the rule) based on households. 
It is not clear how to pursue this aspect empirically. For a quantitative 
statistical analysis individual level data are needed. Some such data are 
available, but they allow for an analysis of NSDAP-membership (see Ka-
ter, 1983, as a general reference, or e.g. Jarausch and Arminger, 1989, on 
the teaching profession during the Third Reich) rather than party attach-
ment or vote choice. And there is a distinctive difference between formal 
membership (before 1933!) and psychological attachment. 
Mobilization and volatility. Mostly, the middle class thesis (Lipset, 1960) 
and the mobilization theory (Bendix, 1952; after his recantation e.g. 
0*Lessker, 1968) are seen as rival explanations. The more recent studies 
basically support the first - in essence, not in rhetoric - while they refute 
the second for the 1930 elections when major NSDAP gains first materia-
lized (e.g. Hanisch, 1983, p.229; Brown, 1982, p.300; earlier Waldman, 
1973, p.225). For the following elections in 1932, however, some bandwa-
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gon effect is considered likely. Technically, these analyses seem sound. 
However, they are based on a rather narrow concept of mobilization. An 
increase in turnout obviously indicates a mobilization process. However, 
such a process may be at work even when turnout is constant. Non-voters 
may be persuaded to vote (for an emerging party), and past voters (of 
established parties) may stay home. And the amount of individual change 
in the voting electorate can be quite large (see again note 16). Again, aggre-
gate data analysis is faced with an inherent limit. 
There are two structural factors which make it plausible to assume a 
fairly high amount of volatility in the electorate even before turnout in-
creased in 1930 and 1932. First, the party system was not consolidated, it 
was in a state of flux. (23) Second, due to universal suffrage and a lower 
age limit, the electorate had vastly expanded. With respect to the party 
system, the ongoing rearrangement of non-Catholic bourgeois parties 
thwarted the formation and maintenance of party attachments of voters in 
the political center. This created favorable conditions for new parties ca-
tering to the interests - and fears - of these voters. With respect to the 
newly enfranchised women, it seems plausible to assume that they showed 
less political interest and involvement (»Politik ist Mannersache«) and 
that they were more likely to support conservative goals (law and order, 
economic security, etc), extrapolating findings from the early post World 
War II period to the past. In stark contrast to the CDU in the Federal 
Republic, the established parties of the Weimar Republic hardly satisfied 
the needs for strong leadership and economic success leaving a large seg-
ment of the electorate unattached to the political system. 
However, little solid evidence is available to document that women were 
more drawn to the NSDAP than men. Sex specific election returns do 
indicate an overrepresentation of women in the clientele of conservative 
parties, but not necessarily among NSDAP voters. Unfortunately, for the 
decisive phase 1930-1932, only select non-representative data are available 
(see Falter et al., 1986, p.83-85). 
In sum, it should not be assumed that the Weimar population was solidly 
split into a segment of habitual voters of some 75 per cent and a political 
aloof rest of some 25 per cent which was the primary target of mobilization 
strategies. Rather, the non-voting segment should be conceptualized as 
fluctuating, subject to time-specific mobilization strategies. In addition, 
successful mobilization in some segments may be counterbalanced by de-
mobilization in others. Consequently, turnout figures (including those for 
smaller aggregate units like »Kreise«) may not capture the effect of Nazi 
mobilization strategies. 
Economic crises unci system failure. Here, the studies of the Falter group 
truly break new ground and force substantial revisions of taken for gran-
ted knowledge: Personal hardship (unemployment) generally did not 
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translate into a vote for the Nazis. Unemployment among the industrial 
working class led to radicalization, but it favored the KPD as the more 
extreme of the two Left parties not the NSDAP. As always, ecological 
inference is problematic. Yet, using the much more suitable »Kreise« data 
base, earlier findings and more recent confirmations can now be dismis-
sed. For example, Frey and Week (1981, p.23) had argued that the specta-
cular rise of the NSDAP was mainly due to high unemployment. They 
further contend that without the unemployed the Nazi vote share in July 
1932 would been just 22.0 instead of 37.3 per cent (based on valid votes). 
However, economic factors may still be at the heart of the rise of Na-
zism, though the link must be conceptualized in a different way. Falter et 
al. (1983, p.550) offer one such explanation. They hypothesize that the 
government loses confidence and support with voters not directly affected 
by unemployment but who perceive rising unemployment as an indicator 
of government ineffectiveness. However, unemployment is probably just 
one factor shaping the overall perception of the government's economic 
competence. Inflation is another, and most likely an even more important 
one. Without survey data, however, this issue cannot be resolved empiri-
cally. 
Perceived economic competence - or lack thereof - on part of the 
established political parties, is a very plausible link between the economic 
crises and the rise of the NSDAP. It is fully consistent with the findings of 
modern voting research. For example, the first major economic downturn 
in the postwar era led to a remarkable success of the NPD (a neo-Nazi 
party by many standards) in the 1969 elections. However, unemployed 
voters were not more likely to vote for the NPD than others (see Rattinger, 
1983, p.260). In contrast to Weimar much more restrictive electoral rules, 
i.e. the 5 per cent threshold, prevented their parliamentary representation 
in spite of capturing 4.3 per cent of the vote. However, the threshold was 
probably less important than a relatively quick economic recovery. Also, 
with the CDU forced into opposition, the established conservative party 
was better able to integrate voters leaning to the far Right. 
In modern research, the importance of economic conditions for the vo-
ters' confidence and trust in the established political system is further do-
cumented by studies on system support over time. A dense time series 
covering the period from 1976 on shows a drastic decline of satisfaction 
with democracy parallel to a simultaneous rise of both unemployment and 
inflation in 1980/81; and a recovery of the satisfaction level after inflation 
was curbed (Kuechler, 1986b and 1991). Unemployment alone, however, is 
not sufficient for a marked loss of confidence. During the 1980s conti-
nuing high levels of unemployment coexisted with high satisfaction level. 
Together, ecological analyses and substantive findings from modern vo-
ting research strongly suggest that the economic crisis was essential to the 
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quick rise of Nazism and the demise of the Weimar Republic. However, 
the unemployed themselves were not the major agent of this transition 
and unemployment alone does not necessarily result in a loss of system 
support. 
Summary. Drawing on the various studies, the following comprehensive 
account emerges: The NSDAP met an electorate which predominantly had 
not formed strong attachments to established parties. Where such ties had 
developed - as between the industrial working class and the Left block 
parties and as between rural Catholics and Zentrum - they remained intact 
throughout the Weimar period. The lower middle classes (parts of which 
are classified as working class in the census categories) outside the rural 
Catholic areas constituted the mass base for the National Socialists. The 
failure of the established parties to master economic problems laid the 
ground for the Nazis' successful mobilization of dissatisfaction. However, 
the people most directly affected were not the prime agents. Rather, eco-
nomic crises systematically eroded whatever system support there was in 
the first place. And in contrast to the situation after World War II, large 
segments of the population were latently hostile towards the democratic 
order right from the start. A largely unattached and disoriented electorate 
set the stage, economic doom provided the trigger for the rise of the 
NSDAP. 
Consequences for Future Research 
If this comprehensive view is correct, some implications for future re-
search are imminent. First of all, additional ecological regression analyses 
covering all of Germany will have a diminishing rate of return. A com-
prehensive aggregate data set on the community level (»Gemeinden«) -
another item on the agenda of the Falter group - would be more valuable 
as an information resource for regional and local studies than as a base for 
replications on a lower aggregation level. Further systematic empirical stu-
dies should focus on the mobilization strategies of the NSDAP on the one 
hand, and on the reluctance or openness on part of the voters to support 
the Nazi movement on the other (see also Hamilton, 1982, p.441). Why did 
the Nazis succeed where other radical parties opposing the established 
system, e.g. the Communists, failed? In the absence of survey data, i.e. data 
reflecting attitudes and beliefs, voting research must broaden its scope 
beyond the final act of voting. To gain deeper understanding of the 
NSDAP's electoral success, the Nazis must empirically be studied as a 
social and political movement. While the ideological aspect of the move-
ment is well researched, much work is left to be done with respect to the 
organizational aspects. Here, the conceptual framework of resource mo-
bilization theory (e.g. Zald and McCarthy, 1987) could be most helpful. 
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Given the lack of survey data and the highly specific nature of regional 
contexts, I feel that local studies are the best avenue for further systematic 
empirical research. Hamilton (1984) as well as Hennig (1987, 1989) pro-
vide examples of such an approach though they leave room for methodo-
logical improvements. Studies of this kind may include ecological regres-
sion analyses. But, more importantly, in local studies data from a variety of 
information sources can be included into a systematic empirical analysis. 
The dynamics of political preferences, in particular attraction and resi-
stance to the Nazi movement, must be described in detail to truly under-
stand the Nazi vote. In the process, disciplinary boundaries must be trans-
gressed. Historical research with a perspective on everyday life (e.g. Peu-
kert, 1987) needs to be blended with research traditions in sociology and 
political science. If successful, the shortage of data suitable for quantitative 
statistical analysis may turn into an asset. A new model for voting research 
- b o t h historical and contemporary - may emerge at a time where modern 
electoral research is stifled by the overreliance on easily available survey 
data. 
Local studies of this kind will require a substantial input of time and -
like all local studies - they are faced with problem of external validity or 
generalizability. Local sites must be selected based on a conceptual typo-
logy of possible cases. The selected cases should be exemplars for key ca-
tegories in such a typology. The knowledge accumulated so far is crucial 
for this selection process. The local studies, then, are not an alternative to 
the quantitative studies discussed here. Rather, they are a timely comple-
ment. 
Notes 
(1) An earlier version of this paper (in German) was presented at the 
24th Meeting of the German Sociological Society (joint congress of 
the German, Austrian, and Swiss sociological societies), October 4-7, 
1988, in Zurich, Switzerland, as part of the deliberations of an ad hoc 
group on the 'Sociology of National Socialism' convened by Thomas 
Herz. Apart from minor editorial changes, this version was com-
pleted in the fall of 1990. Several discussions with Jürgen Falter 
provided a number of very useful suggestions to improve the earlier 
version. I gratefully acknowledge his contributions notwithstanding 
some remaining difference of opinion. 
(2) Heberle completed his study in 1934, but it was not published in 
Germany before 1963 as Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus. 
In contrast to this German edition, the first American edition of 
1945 and a new edition in 1970 (which I refer to) contains an in-
44 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 17 — 1992 — No. 1, 22-52
troductory chapter on genesis and nature of the NSDAP and a con-
cluding chapter from which the quotation is taken. 
(3) Apart from the now available comprehensive monograph (Falter 
1991), a book chapter (Falter 1987) provides an overview easily ac-
cessible to non-specialists while a journal article (Falter and Hänisch 
1986) follows a more traditional academic format. In English, Falter 
(1990) is the most suitable source. 
(4) Obviously, with respect to other research topics, aggregate units may 
constitute genuine social units. See Hannan (1971) for a more ge-
neral discussion on aggregation and disaggregation in sociology. 
(5) There are over 1100 »Kreise« in the Weimar Republic. To eliminate 
the effect of changing boundaries some merging was necessary. Hä-
nisch (1983) considers 787 units, the Falter »Kreise« data base con-
sists of 831 units. 
(6) As with any standard methodological topic with potentially broad 
applications, specific discussions on the issue are likely to reoccur in 
various substantive fields. Sometimes these debates get heated, but 
typically they quickly lose significance. Thus, no attempt is made to 
reconstruct the debate in the Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
from the early 1970s. The title in the Sage paper series (Langbein and 
Lichtman, 1978) covers this debate and provides a nice introduction 
requiring only a moderate amount of statistical background. 
(7) »Wahlkreis« could be literally translated as »constituency«. Howe-
ver, the use of this term may be misleading for readers used to ma-
jority voting systems. 
(8) This is especially important for unemployment indicators where the-
re is a wide choice of options. Such indicators can be based on all 
persons in the labor force (»Erwerbspersonen«), on all persons cur-
rently employed (»Erwerbstätige«), on all persons employed in a par-
ticular sector of the economy, on the total population - above/below 
a certain age, etc. In case of the Weimar Republic total population 
may be the best choice short of total population over age 20 (which is 
practically identical with the pool of eligible voters). Employment 
statistics (»Beschäftigten-Statistik«) should be avoided, because they 
are based on the location of the employer rather than the residence 
of the employee. 
(9) Today, the only legitimate use of (bivariate) correlations is in provi-
ding direct comparisons with the older, methodologically less so-
phisticated literature. 
(10) Necessarily, the introduction of an interaction term causes a high 
level of multicollinearity (as measured by the tolerance or a similar 
regression statistic). However, subdividing the population according 
to the values of one variable e.g. into predominantly Protestant and 
predominantly Catholic »Kreise«, has even more disadvantages. 
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(11) In general, analysis of this kind are based on the total population of 
(aggregate) units rather than on a random sample. Consequently, the 
issue may be raised whether the use of any form of statistical in-
ference is adequate. However, this is an old debate which will never 
be settled for good. One (old) justification involves the notion of a 
hypothetical universe', see e.g. Kuechler (1979, p.l 14—117 for a more 
detailed discussion). 
(12) As an example, 'tree analysis' diagrams as found in several publica-
tion of the Falter group could be based on adequate statistical tech-
niques rather than simple percentage calculation based on an increa-
singly small number of cases - and hence high margins of error. 
(13) Childers (1983, p.276) is an unfortunate counter example. There is 
no documentation (the methodological appendix included) on how 
he selected a total of 212 urban and 266 rural communities. 
(14) The ICPSR (Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research in Ann Arbor, MI, USA) data set »German Weimar Re-
public Data, 1920-1933« (ICPSR Study-No. 0042) contains a number 
of errors (see Falter and Gruner, 1981 for details). Yet, until recently, 
it was the only generally available machine-readable source. 
(15) This is best documented by the two tables in which he summarizes 
the major results of his statistical analysis (Childers, 1983, 
p.280/281): For almost all elections between 1924 and 1932, the 
NSDAP vote share is positively related to both the percentage of 
Catholics and the percentage of Protestants. This is pure nonsense 
from a substantive point of view and not just a computation or prin-
ting error. Childers fails to realize that regression estimates are sensi-
tive to multicollinearity, and including both indicators produces just 
this: In Weimar, the percentage of Catholics and the percentage of 
Protestants add up to almost exactly 1 in all units. 
(16) Major contributions to the organization and implementation of the-
se studies were made by Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and 
Franz-Urban Pappi. Since 1974 these studies are conducted by the 
»Forschungsgruppe Wahlen« (Manfred Berger, Wolfgang Gibowski, 
Dieter Roth). All studies are part of the German Electoral Data 
(GED) project at the Central Archive at the University of Cologne, 
Germany, and ICPSR at the University of Michigan, USA and can 
be obtained from these sources at nominal cost. 
(17) In part, this is a consequence of high turnout. Leaving aside ge-
nerational replacement, only between 0 and 11 per cent of the voters 
could have previously abstained if turnout is 90 per cent at both 
times. In contrast, with a turnout of 75 per cent, the mathematical 
possible range of new voters would extend from 0 to 33 per cent. 
Additional survey data indicate an empirical value close to the lower 
bound. 
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(18) Technically, CDU and CSU are separate parties like Zentrum and 
BVP during Weimar. With respect to voting they are treated as one 
since they do not compete against each other at the polls. 
(19) This is a very general characterization which holds over time. For 
any specific election, more refined analyses usually show some in-
teraction effects, e.g. no effect of union membership among frequent 
church attenders. Such analyses are models which of course must be 
compatible with the empirical data base. However, models with dif-
ferent specific traits can be equally compatible with the data (see e.g. 
Kuechler, 1979, with applications to the 1976 elections in West Ger-
many). 
(20) Taking survey responses at face value much higher figures can be 
derived. However, momentary preference or hypothetical vote choi-
ce tend to inflate propensity for actual change of party alliance. It is 
somewhat like establishing divorce rates by responses to survey que-
stions about marital happiness. 
(21) Jesse (1985) provides a detailed overview on the subject in post-war 
Germany; Schanbacher (1982) is a valuable source for the Weimar 
Republic. 
(22) See Brand and Honolka (1986) for some interesting attempts to 
pursue such a research agenda. Unfortunately, many methodological 
problem remain to be solved. 
(23) See Claggett et al. (1982) on the formation of the German party 
system in pre-Weimar and the impact of political leadership as well 
as social composition of the electorate. 
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